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Safety, 
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BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is in the Court of Appeals based upon Utah 
Code Ann- § 78-2A-3(2)(a) (1992), 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A, Is Petitioner entitled to seek review of an 
Administrative Order of the Driver's License Division by way of 
an Extraordinary Writ under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Argument Priority No. 14\l5 
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This determination is a question of law and the Court 
should accord no deference to the district court's judgment but 
should review it under a "correctness" standard. State v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991); Rollins v. Petersen, 
813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 
P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). 
B. Did the trial court lack jurisdiction to hear 
Petitioner's claim based on his failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies? 
This determination is a question of law and this Court 
should accord no deference to the district court's judgment which 
was reviewed under a "correctness" standard. State v. Johnson, 
821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 
1156, 1159 (Utah 1991); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 
1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Attached in the Addendum are the following 
determinative statutes and rules: Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-131; §§ 
63-46b-14, 15, and 18; § 78-3-4; and Rule 65B, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the final judgment of the Eighth 
Judicial District Court, Uintah County, granting relief to the 
2 
Petitioner. Petitioner filed this action for relief under Rule 
65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Extraordinary Relief, seeking 
a reversal of the administrative suspension of his driving 
privileges by the Respondent. 
Petitioner's driving privileges were suspended for 90 
days following an informal adjudicative proceeding before the 
Driver's License Division of the Department of Public Safety (the 
"Division"), the Respondent. The suspension was based upon the 
Petitioner having been in the actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle with a breath alcohol content above .08% Utah Code Ann. § 
41-2-130 (Supp. 1992). 
Rather than seeking judicial review of that 
administrative order of suspension in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-131 (Supp. 1992) and Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14 and 
15 (Supp. 1992), Petitioner sought relief by way of a petition 
for an Extraordinary Writ, Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See Petition for Extraordinary Relief, R. at 2, 
Addendum at 7. The Respondent Division filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the Petition and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which 
were denied. The trial court then granted relief to the 
Petitioner pursuant to Rule 65B, R. at 50, Addendum at 6. This 
appeals followed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Extraordinary 
Relief, is only available when there is no other plain, speedy 
and adequate remedy available to a Petitioner. Here, the 
Driver's License Division and the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Acts allow for judicial review of the order. Such constitutes a 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law therefore a proceeding 
under Rule 65B for an Extraordinary Writ is not available. 
POINT II 
Parties may obtain judicial review of administrative 
agency actions only after exhausting and availing themselves of 
all administrative remedies. Petitioner failed to seek his 
administrative remedy of an appeal to the District Court and that 
constitutes a failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction and authority to hear 
Petitioner's claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO OBTAIN REVIEW OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT BY WAY OF 
PETITION UNDER RULE 65B, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Petitioner brought this action for Extraordinary Relief 
under the provisions of Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It is Respondent's position that Petitioner is limited to 
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proceeding by way of judicial review of an administrative order 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-131 (1988) and §§ 63-4a-15, -
17, and -18 (Supp. 1992). 
Petitioner was arrested on July 3, 1992, in Vernal and 
charged with driving under the influence. On August 16, 1992, 
pursuant to the Petitioner's request, a hearing was duly held 
before the Respondent Division pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-
130 (Supp. 1992) on whether the Respondent should suspend the 
driving privileges of the Petitioner. As a result of and based 
upon that hearing, the Respondent issued an Order suspending the 
driving privileges of the Petitioner for a period of 90 days. 
Petitioner initiated these proceedings to review and reverse the 
actions of the Respondent in suspending the driving privileges of 
the Petitioner and to reinstate the Petitioner's driving 
privileges. See Petition for Extraordinary Relief and documents 
filed therewith, R. at 2, Addendum at 7. 
Proceedings under Rule 65B, Extraordinary Relief, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, are only available in certain specified 
circumstances. Concerning the availability of the remedy, the 
Rule provides: 
Where no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition 
the court for extraordinary relief on any of 
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the grounds set forth in paragraph (e) 
(involving the wrongful use of judicial 
authority and the failure to exercise such 
authority)[.] 
Petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy under the 
Driver's License statute as well as the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et sea. (Supp. 1992), 
and Rule 65B by its own terms is not available. 
Proceedings were held at the administrative level to 
suspend the driving privileges of the Petitioner pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-2-130 (Supp. 1992). Concerning review of that 
proceeding, Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-131 (1988) provides: 
Any person denied a license or whose 
license has been cancelled, suspended, or 
revoked by the department may seek judicial 
review of the department's order. 
The administrative proceedings before the Driver's License 
Division concerning Petitioner's drivers license were subject to 
the Administrative Procedures Act of Utah, see Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-l and Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 (Ut. App. 
1990). All hearings before the Division have been designated as 
informal adjudicated proceedings. See Utah Code Admin. Proc. 
R.708-17. Judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
is provided for in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-14, and the Act provides that judicial review 
shall be in the district courts by way of trial de novo, § 63-
6 
46b-15(l). See also Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, supra. 
The Utah statutory procedures with regard to driver's 
license matters as well as administrative procedures both allow 
for review and provide a procedure for review. As such, they 
constitute the availability of a remedy that is "plain, speedy 
and adequate" and therefore relief under Rule 65B is not 
available. 
The Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 65B 
reaches a similar conclusion. In Merrvihew v. Salt Lake County 
Planning, 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1980), Plaintiff sought to 
reinstate a zoning ordinance and a building permit issued 
pursuant thereto. Rather than appealing pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27-16, Plaintiff sought relief under Rule 65B, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court disallowed any relief 
because the Plaintiff sought his relief under Rule 65B rather 
than the statutory appeal procedure: 
By ignoring a plain, speedy, and 
adequate remedy at law, the plaintiffs placed 
themselves out of reach of the extraordinary 
writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus is not 
a substitute for and cannot be used in civil 
proceedings to serve the purpose of an 
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error. 
659 P.2d at 1067, quoting Crist v. Mapleton Citv. 497 P.2d 633, 
634 (1972). 
Since petitioner could obtain judicial review of the 
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administrative decision suspending his driving privileges, and 
had the ability under the Administrative Procedures Act to obtain 
a stay of that order pending a hearing, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-18 (1988), Petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy 
to review the administrative decision of the Respondent. 
Therefore, proceedings for relief by way of Rule 65B, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, are not available to him, and his petition 
should have been dismissed. This Court should reverse the lower 
Court's decision and remand with directions to dismiss the 
petition. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR 
PETITIONER'S CLAIM BASED UPON HIS FAILURE TO 
EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
Utah law provides a procedure for review of the order 
of the Respondent suspending the driving privileges of the 
Petitioner in this case. That procedure is the filing of an 
action in district court seeking judicial review by way of trial 
de novo of the administrative decision of the Petitioner. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-131 (Supp. 1992); Brinkerhoff v. 
Schwendiman, supra. District courts may only review agency 
actions after the party has "exhaust[ed] all administrative 
remedies available", including agency and judicial review. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2). See also Utah Code Ann. S 78-3-4 (5) 
(Supp. 1992). Petitioner failed to seek judicial review of the 
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administrative order, thereby not exhausting his administrative 
remedies, and the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction over 
his claimed review. 
Also, Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, has a 
similar exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement. In 
Merrvihew v. Salt Lake County Planning, supra, the Court 
dismissed the claim for judicial review under Rule 65B for the 
plaintiff's failure to seek administrative and judicial review of 
the decision of the planning commission, stating, at 659 P.2d 
1067: 
Consequently, we reaffirm that the 
general proposition of law that parties must 
exhaust administrative remedies as a 
prerequisite to seeking judicial review is 
applicable to claims relating to denial of a 
building permit . . . 
We do not reach the issue of the 
validity of the zoning ordinance because we 
hold that plaintiff's failure to exhaust his 
administrative remedies prevents him from 
seeking relief at this time from the courts. 
This requirement under Rule 65B of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is really the other side of the 
requirement under the extraordinary writ procedures that there is 
"no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy . . . available," 
Rule 65B(a) — if there are administrative remedies and 
procedures for review of the administrative decision, as allowed 
or mandated by statute or rule, then there jLs. an adequate remedy 
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available. Extraordinary relief under Rule 65B is limited to 
those situations where there is no other remedy available. "An 
extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for general review, and 
cannot be used as such." Anderson v. Baker, 296 P.2d 283 (Utah 
1956). 
The jurisdiction and authority of the trial court to 
hear petitioner's claims - either as judicial review of an 
administrative order or as a proceeding on an extraordinary writ 
- is limited to instances where Petitioner has exhausted all of 
his administrative remedies. Since he failed to do so, the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction and authority and this Court should 
reverse the Order and remand the case with direction to dismiss 
the Petition. 
CONCLUSION 
Since both the driver license statutes and the 
Administrative Procedures Act allow for judicial review of the 
administrative decision of the Respondent, there is a plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy available to the Petitioner for review 
of the administrative decision. That remedy precludes relief 
under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, 
Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and 
failed to comply with the procedures for review of administrative 
decision and the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction and 
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authority to hear his claim. The trial court should have 
dismissed Petitioner's claim and denied him any relief. 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
reverse the decision of the trial court granting relief to the 
Petitioner under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, should 
hold that review of the administrative decision of the Respondent 
is only available pursuant to a petition for judicial review and 
trial de novo, and remand this matter to district court with 
directions to dismiss the Petition. 
DATED this J) 1 day of March, 1992. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Governmental Affairs Division 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
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copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT, this Q* day of 
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209 East 100 North 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 41-2-131 (1988) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 63-46b-14 (1989) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 63-46b-15 (Supp. 1992) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 63-46b-18 (1988) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-3-4 (1992) 
R.65B, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
RULE 65B, U.R.C.P. 
ORDER ON PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
RULE 65B U.R.C.P. 
41-2-131. Judicial review of license cancella-
tion, revocation or suspension* 
(1) Any person denied a license or whose license 
has been cancelled, suspended, or revoked by the de-
partment may seek judicial review of the depart-
ment's order. 
(2) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudica-
tive proceedings is in the district court in the county 
where the person resides. Persons not residing in the 
state shall file in Salt Lake County or the county 
where the offense occurred which resulted in the can-
cellation, suspension, or revocation. 1987 a* &&.) 
ADD.l 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicial 
review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after ex-
hausting all administrative remedies available, ex-
cept that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter 
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judi-
cial review of the requirement to exhaust any or 
all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inade-
quate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring ex-
haustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial re-
view of final agency action within 30 days after 
the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have 
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all 
other appropriate parties as respondents and 
shall meet the form requirements specified in 
this chapter. isss 
ADD. 2 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudi-
cative proceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceed-
ings, except that the juvenile court shall have 
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating 
to removal or placement decisions regarding chil-
dren in state custody. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where 
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal 
place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the 
party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency 
action to be reviewed, together with a dupli-
cate copy, summary, or brief description of 
the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were 
parties in the informal adjudicative proceed-
ings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from 
the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party 
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the 
type and extent of relief requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief, 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall de-
termine all questions of fact and law and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section. mo 
ADD. 3 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other 
temporary remedies pending final dis-
position. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a stay of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agenc/i 
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it 
finds that: 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in deny-
ing the stay; or 
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is 
likely to prevail on the merits when the 
court finally disposes of the matter; 
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will 
suffer irreparable injury without immediate 
relief; 
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking 
review will not substantially harm other 
parties to the proceedings; and 
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, 
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not 
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's ac-
tion under the circumstances. 1987 
ADD. 4 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when court does not exist 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraor-
dinary writs and other writs necessary to carry into 
effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council and subject to policies 
established by the Judicial Council, cases filed in the 
district court, which are also within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the circuit court, may be transferred to 
the circuit court by the presiding judge of the district 
court in multiple judge districts or the district court 
judge in single judge districts. The transfer of these 
cases may be made upon the court's own motion or 
upon the motion of either party for adjudication. 
When an order is made transferring a case, the court 
shall transmit the pleadings and papers to the circuit 
court to which the case is transferred. The circuit 
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been 
originally commenced in the circuit court and any 
appeals from final judgments shall be to the Court of 
Appeals. 
(4) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and 
decrees of the district court are under Sections 78-2-2 
and 78-2a-3. 
(5) The district court has jurisdiction to review 
agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, and 
shall comply with the requirements of that chapter, 
in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
(6) When a circuit court is given original or appel-
late jurisdiction of a matter and no such court exists 
in the county of proper venue, the district court shall 
have jurisdiction. Notwithstanding Section 78-3-14.5, 
criminal fines and forfeitures collected in such cases 
shall be distributed as if filed in the circuit court. 
1992 
ADD. 5 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy is available, a person 
may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any 
of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving 
wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving 
other types of wrongful restraint on personal liberty), 
paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or 
corporate authority) or paragraph (e) (involving the 
wrongful use of judicial authority and the failure to 
exercise such authority). There shall be no special 
form of writ The procedures in this rule shall govern 
proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. 
To the extent that this rule does not provide special 
procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordi-
nary relief shall be governed by the procedures set 
forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful imprisonment 
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to 
imprisonment in a state prison, other correc-
tional facility or county jail who asserts that the 
commitment resulted from a substantial denial 
of rights may petition the court for relief under 
this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern 
proceedings based on claims relating to original 
commitments and commitments for violation of 
probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not 
govern proceedings based on claims relating to 
the terms or conditions of confinement. 
(2) Commencement The proceeding shall be 
commenced by filing a petition, together with a 
copy thereof, with the clerk of the court in which 
the commitment leading to confinement was is-
sued, except that the court may order a change of 
venue on motion of a party for the convenience of 
the parties or witnesses. 
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition 
shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has 
in relation to the legality of the commitment. Ad-
ditional claims relating to the legality of the 
commitment may not be raised in subsequent 
proceedings except for good cause shown. The pe-
tition shall state: 
(i) the place where the petitioner if re-
strained; 
(ii) the name of the court by which the pe-
titioner was convicted and sentenced and the 
dates of proceedings in which the conviction 
was entered, together with the court's case 
number for those proceedings, if known by 
the petitioner, 
(iii) in plain and concise terms, all of the 
facta on the basis of which the petitioner 
claims a substantial violation of rights as the 
result of the commitment; 
(iv) whether or not the judgment of con-
viction or the commitment for violation of 
probation or parole has been reviewed on ap-
peal, and, if so, the number and caption or 
title of the appellate proceeding and the re-
sults of the review; 
(v) whether the legality of the commit-
ment has already been abjudicated in any 
prior post-conviction or other civil proceed-
ing, and if so the reasons for the denial of 
relief in the prior proceeding. 
(4) Attachments to the petition. The peti-
tioner shall attach to the petition affidavits, cop-
ies of records or other evidence available to the 
petitioner in support of the allegations. The peti-
tioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of 
the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that ad-
judicated the legality of the commitment, and a 
copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If 
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memo-
randa are not attached, the petition shall state 
why they are not attached. 
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The peti-
tioner shall not set forth argument or citations or 
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies 
of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On 
the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly 
deliver it to the presiding judge of the court in 
which it is filed. The presiding judge shall if pos-
sible assign the proceeding to the judge who is-
sued the commitment. 
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review 
of the petition, if it is apparent to the court that 
the issues presented in the petition have already 
been abjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for 
any other reason any claim in the petition shall 
appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forth-
with issue an order dismissing the claim, stating 
that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order 
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceed-
ings on the claim shall terminate with the entry 
of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal 
need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of 
law. 
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the 
petition, the court concludes that all or part of 
the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court 
shall designate the portions of the petition that 
are not frivolous and direct the clerk to serve a 
copy of the petition and a copy of any memoran-
dum by mail upon the attorney general and the 
county attorney. 
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty 
days (plus time allowed under these rules for ser-
vice by mail) after service of a copy of the petition 
upon the attorney general and county attorney, 
or within such other period of time as the court 
may allow, the attorney general or county attor-
ney shall answer or otherwise respond to the por-
tions of the petition that have not been dismissed 
and shall serve the answer or other response 
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). 
Within twenty days (plus time allowed for ser-
vice by mail) after service of any motion to dis-
miss or for summary judgment, the petitioner 
may respond by memorandum to the motion. No 
further pleadings or amendments will be permit-
ted unless ordered by the court. 
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the 
court shall promptly set the proceeding for a 
hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon 
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motion for good cause, the court may grant leave 
to either party to take discovery or to extend the 
date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the 
court may order either the petitioner or the state 
or county to obtain any relevant transcript or 
court records. The court may also order a pre-
hearing conference, but the conference shall not 
be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on 
the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be 
present before the court at hearings on disposi-
tive issues but need not otherwise be present in 
court during the proceeding. 
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the 
petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order 
with respect to the validity of the challenged 
commitment and with respect to rearraignment, 
retrial, resentencing, custody, bail or discharge. 
The court shall enter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, as appropriate, following any evi-
dentiary hearing or any hearing on a dispositive 
motion. Upon application of the attorney general 
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, 
the court may stay release of the petitioner pend-
ing appeal of its order. 
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of 
the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to 
any party as it deems appropriate. If the peti-
tioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceed-
ing, the petitioner may proceed upon an affidavit 
of impecuniosity, in which event the court may 
direct that the costs be paid by the county in 
which the complainant was originally charged. 
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order en-
tered upon the petition may be appealed to and 
reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme 
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes govern-
ing appeals to those courts. 
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal lib* 
erty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by 
paragraph (b) of this rule, this paragraph (c) 
shall govern all petitions claiming that a person 
has been wrongfully restrained of personal lib-
erty, and the court may grant relief appropriate 
under this paragraph. 
(2) Commencement The proceeding shall be 
commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of 
the court in the district in which the petitioner is 
restrained or the respondent resides or in which 
the alleged restraint is occurring. 
(3) Contents of the petition and attach-
ments. The petition shall contain a short, plain 
statement of the facts on the basis of which the 
petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the re-
spondent and the place where the person is re-
strained. It shall state the cause or pretense of 
the restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall 
state whether the legality of the restraint has 
already been abjudicated in a prior proceeding 
and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in 
the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall attach 
to the petition any legal process available to the 
petitioner that resulted in restraint. The peti-
tioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of 
the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior 
proceeding that abjudicated the legality of the 
restraint 
(4) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review 
of the petition, if it is apparent to the court that 
the legality of the restraint has already been ad-
judicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other 
reason any claim in the petition shall appear 
frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith is-
sue an order dismissing the claim, stating that 
the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons 
for this conclusion. The order shall be sent by 
mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim 
shall terminate with the entry of the order of 
dismissal. 
(5) Issuance and contents of the hearing 
order. If the petition is not dismissed as being 
frivolous on its face, the court shall issue a hear-
ing order directing the respondent to appear be-
fore the court at a specified time for a hearing on 
the legality of the restraint. The court shall di-
rect the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and 
the hearing order by mail upon the respondent. 
In the hearing order, the court may direct the 
respondent to bring before it the person alleged 
to be restrained. The court may direct the respon-
dent to file an answer to the petition within a 
period of time specified in the hearing order. If 
the petitioner waives the right to be present at 
the hearing, the hearing order shall be modified 
accordingly. 
(6) Temporary relief. If it appears that the 
person alleged to be restrained will be removed 
from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irrepa-
rable injury before compliance with the hearing 
order can be enforced, the court shall issue a war-
rant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent 
before the court to be dealt with according to law. 
Pending a determination of the petition, the 
court may place the person alleged to have been 
restrained in the custody of such other persons as 
may be appropriate. 
(7) Alternative service of the bearing or-
der. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it 
appears that a person other than the respondent 
has custody of the person alleged to be re-
strained, the hearing order and any other process 
issued by the court may be served on the person 
having custody in the manner and with the same 
effect as if that person had been named as re-
spondent in the action. 
(8) Avoidance of service by respondent If 
anyone having custody of the person alleged to be 
restrained avoids service of the hearing order or 
attempts wrongfully to remove the person from 
the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immedi-
ately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff 
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before 
the court to be dealt with according to law. 
(9) Hearing and subsequent proceedings. 
At the time specified in the hearing order for the 
bearing, the court shall hear the matter in a 
summary fashion and shall render judgment ac-
cordingly. The respondent or other person having 
custody shall appear with the person alleged to 
be restrained or shall state the reasons for failing 
to do so. If the hearing order requires an answer 
to the petition, the respondent shall file an an-
swer within the time prescribed in the hearing 
order. The answer shall state plainly whether the 
respondent has restrained the person alleged to 
have been restrained, whether the person so re-
strained has been transferred to any other per-
son, and if so the identity of the transferee, the 
date of the transfer, and the reason or authority 
for the transfer. The hearing order shall not be 
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misde-
scription in the order or the petition, if enough is 
stated to impart the meaning and intent of the 
proceeding to the respondent. 
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise pub-
lic authority. 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. 
The attorney general may, and when directed to 
do so by the governor shall, petition the court for 
relief on the grounds enumerated in this para-
graph (d). Any person who is not required to be 
represented by the attorney general and who is 
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enu-
merated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph 
(d) may petition the court under this paragraph 
(d) if (A) the person claims to be entitled to an 
office unlawfully held by another or (B) if the 
attorney general fails to file a petition under this 
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's 
claim. A petition filed by a person other than the 
attorney general under this paragraph shall be 
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the 
petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking 
with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for 
costs and damages that may be recovered against 
the petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties 
shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided 
for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief 
may be granted: (A) where a person usurps, in-
trudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a 
public office, whether civil or military, a fran-
chise, or an office in a corporation created by the 
authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public 
officer does or permits any act that results in a 
forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons act as a 
corporation in the state of Utah without being 
legally incorporated; (D) where any corporation 
has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating 
to the creation, alteration or renewal of corpora-
tions; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited 
or misused its corporate rights, privileges or 
franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on die petition. On the fil-
ing of a petition, the court may require that no-
tice be given to adverse parties before issuing a 
hearing order, or may issue a hearing order re-
quiring the adverse party to appear at the hear-
ing on the merits. The court may also grant tem-
porary relief in accordance with the terms of 
Rule 65A. 
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or fail-
ure to comply with duty. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or 
whose interests are threatened by any of the acts 
enumerated in this paragraph (e) may petition 
the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief 
may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, ad-
ministrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused 
its discretion; (B) where en inferior court, admin-
istrative agency, corporation or person has failed 
to perform an act required by law as a duty of 
office, trust or station; or (C) where an inferior 
court, administrative agency, corporation or per-
son has refused the petitioner the use or enjoy-
ment of a right or office to which the petitioner is 
entitled. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the fil-
ing of a petition, the court may require that no-
tice be given to adverse parties before issuing a 
hearing order, or may issue a hearing order re-
quiring the adverse party to appear at the hear-
ing on the merits. The court may direct the infe-
rior court, administrative agency, officer, corpo-
ration or other person named as respondent to 
deliver to the court a transcript or other record of 
the proceedings. The court may also grant tempo-
rary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 
65A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged 
proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's re-
view shall not extend further than to determine 
whether the respondent has regularly pursued 
its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991.) 
ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorney for Defendant 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
(801) 789-1666 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
ROBERT A. KNIBBE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PHIL HIMMELBERGER, 
Bureau Chief, Drivers 
License Services, State 
of Utah, Department of 
Public Safety, 
Respondent. 
: PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
RELIEF 
: Rule 65B, U.R.C.P. 
: Case No. 
: Judge 
Pursuant to Rule 65B(d)(e)(1VT2), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Robert A. Knibbe petitions this Court for an 
extraordinary writ prohibiting Respondent from exercising by 
and through his administrative hearing officers any acts 
terminating petitioner's right to operate a motor vehicle in 
this state by virtue of his arrest July 3, 1992, in Vernal, 
Utah for an alleged offense of violating §41-6-44, et seq. 
U.C.A. as amended. In support of this petition, Petitioner 
alleges as follows: 
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1. Respondent is the duly appointed bureau chief of 
Driver's License Services for the Department of Public Safety, 
State of Utah. 
2. In that capacity respondent causes to be issued 
notices of hearing issued to persons who are arrested within 
this State for allegedly violating §41-6-44, et. seq. U.C.A. 
as amended (DUI)• 
3. Respondent either personally appoints or assists 
in the appointment of administrative hearing officers such as 
C. Niels Nielsen, who conduct hearings pursuant to §41-6-44.10 
U.C.A. as amended, and §44-2-130, U.C.A., 1992, to determine 
in substance (a) whether there was probable cause to stop and 
detain petitioner's motor vehicle by a properly appointed 
peace officer within this State; (b) whether at the time of 
stop and detention the peace officer had refreshable grounds to 
believe that petitioner was under the influence of alcohol 
while driving a motor vehicle within this State and (c) 
whether or not petitioner, by a valid blood alcohol chemical 
test of arresting officer's choice, had a blood alcohol 
content of .08% or greater from a method of testing approved 
by the Commissioner of Public Safety of this State. 
4. On August 26, 1992, at the appointed hour of 
1:30 p.m. in Vernal, Utah, the said C. Niels Nielson, as a 
hearing 
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officer for the Department of Public Safety purported to 
conduct a hearing as contemplated aforesaid in these pleadings 
as an administrative hearing officer for Respondent in his 
official capacity. 
5. Said hearing officer abused his discretion, 
exceeded his jurisdiction as an impartial hearing officer and 
exercised judicial functions taking judicial notice of facts 
which cannot be judicially noticed* Said hearing officer did 
not require any custodian affidavit from Sergeant Chris 
Korning or his successor authenticating that routine tests 
within 40 days of each other had been conducted by certified 
personnel of the Department of Public Safety to test and 
maintain the intoxilyzer located at the Uintah County Jail. 
The said hearing officer found and determined that without any 
documentation as to the maintenance ~~ reliability " and 
substantive evidence being offered, that said intoxilyzer "by 
a preponderance of the evidence" was properly operating on 
July 19, 1992, when a test was administered to Petitioner 
after his arrest. The hearing officer took judicial notice 
that if the machine was tested on July 15, 1992, that it was 
operating correctly on July 19, 1992, without further evidence 
of testing on a before and after examination of the machine as 
contemplated by the breath testing regulations enacted by the 
Public Safety Commissioner. Further the affidavit of the 
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alleged certifying officer is self serving on its face as he 
creates his own certifiation by his own affidavit which was 
not contemoraneously notorized as required in Murray City v. 
Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983) the same having been notorized 
July 16, 1992, in Weber County, Utah. 
6. In so ruling, the hearing officer, in abusing 
his discretion made a finding as to the accuracy of said 
machine in delivering a test result on July 19, 1992, showing 
a chemical analysis of Petitioner's breath equated to 
Petitioner's blood alcohol content, giving a result of .08 or 
greater. 
7. The said hearing officer routinely acts as an 
advocate for arresting officers and for the Department within 
the Department of Public Safety which respondent is in ch'arge 
of in his official duties for the State of Utah and said 
hearing officer does not act as a neutral, unbiased 
administrative officer. 
8. No other speedy or accurate remedy exists to 
permit the forthwith review of the record of the hearing in 
this case. 
9. By virtue of the loss of Petitionees driving 
privileges he will be irreparably harmed in continuing to 
perform his job duties. 
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10. The provisions of §41*6-44.3 U.C.h. as amended, 
are unconstitutional in that they create an non-permissible 
evidentiary presumption. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests the Court set this 
matter down for hearing, issue an Order requiring respondent 
to transcribe the hearing proceedings and certify the 
transcribed proceedings along with the original tape recording 
to this court for review. Petitioner further requests an 
order of this Court finding Respondent and his administrative 
hearing officers and more particularly C. Niels Nielson as 
being guilty of abusing his discretion and abusing his powers 
in not being neutral and conducting hearing such as the one 
complained of herein, in and unbiased and unarbitrary manner. 
DATED this y day of September, 1992. 
MCRAE & DeLAND 
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ROBERT M. McRAE 
At/torney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed, certified postage 
prepaid, a true and correct coayy^ofy the^foregoing to the 
following on this ~? day of rffa0*«*&^ 1992: 
Phil Himmelberger / ^ 
Respondent 
Drivers License Services 
4501 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
-5-
Tom Roberts 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City# Utah 
-6-
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FILED 
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NOV 3 1992 
SnAiv* * / i D 
BY. 
ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorney for Defendant 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, DT 84078 
(801) 789-1666 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
_i DEPUTY 
ROBERT A. KNIBBE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PHIL HIMMELBERGER, 
Bureau Chief, Drivers 
License Services, State 
of Utah, Department of 
Public Safety, 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON 
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
RELIEF 
Rule 65B, U.R.C.P. 
Case No. 920800216CV 
Judge John A. Anderson 
The above entitled case came cr for hearing on October 
21, 1992 before the Honorable John R. Anderson on Petitioner's 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief pursuant to 65B, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Petitioner was present with counsel, 
Robert M. McRae. None of the respondents or counsel were 
present. The Court having before it Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss on the grounds that Petitioner had failed to exhaust 
his administrative remedies and the Court finding that this 
procedure sought by the Petitioner is a valid alternative 
method of appealing Respondent's arbitrary and capricious 
acts, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
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1* Respondents have made a general appearance in 
filing their Motion to Dismiss. 
2. Said Motion is denied for the reasons stated 
above. 
3. Petitioner's Petition is hereby ordered granted 
and Petitioner's driving privileges are hereby ordered 
reinstated in the State of Utah. 
DATED this jj day of oAfbber, 1992. 
lOURT: 
f J Gourde: ANDERSON 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 4-504, Code of 
Judicial Administration, I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of 
the above Order on Petition for Extraordinary Relief to Thorn 
D# Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for 
Respondents, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT 
84114. In the event no formal objection to the form of this 
order is received within five days pursuant to above Rule, the 
Original of this order will be tendered to this court for 
signature. 
DATED this £3- day of &pb fr992. 
